165 armed conºicts during this same period. 5 Clearly, my own dataset of mass atrocities covers just a small portion. 6 I appreciate this opportunity to correct the record.
-Alex J. Bellamy South East Queensland, Australia
Robert A. Pape Replies:
Reading Alex Bellamy's letter, it is refreshing to know that both Bellamy and I are skeptical about the value of armed intervention in many cases. 1 The real disagreement appears to be about whether Bellamy's very good data on mass atrocities reºect responsibility to protect (R2P) principles for intervention. Even if he does not speciªcally qualify each case in this manner, my use of his dataset of mass atrocities as a set of cases that would qualify for intervention according to the standards of R2P is perfectly appropriate. Let me explain.
Bellamy's dataset contains a list of mass atrocities that, in principle, would trigger the international community's responsibility to protect. Speciªcally, to better understand their context, Bellamy collected a dataset of "episodes of mass killing deªned as a minimum of 5,000 civilians killed intentionally." Most of these episodes occurred during armed conºict, but some did take place in peacetime. Using this dataset, Bellamy then goes on to argue that "atrocity prevention requires tailored engagement that targets both peacetime atrocities and those committed within a context of armed conºict." 2 True, Bellamy never describes the measures that should have been taken in particular cases and whether his dataset is the complete list of events that would trigger R2P. Further, he would prefer to use nonmilitary measures to prevent atrocities before they occur-provided these nonmilitary measures actually work.
Bellamy, however, also expects that in some cases nonmilitary measures will fail and armed intervention will be necessary. In 2009 he wrote, "When non-military ways are unable to protect endangered civilians . . . R2P calls for the deployment of military force. Military force can be used either to protect populations from attack or to coerce or compel compliance by targeting those responsible for attacks on civilians." 3 Similarly, in 2012 he stated, "Sadly, preventive efforts will not always succeed. That is why the international community must be prepared to take timely and decisive action, using all the measures placed at its disposal by Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the UN Charter, when it is needed to protect populations. . . . Without the use of force in the R2P toolkit, the international community would effectively need to rely on the perpetrators to deliver protection. That option is unconscionable." 4 Bellamy has repeatedly argued for robust military capabilities for armed intervention, both to defend the intervention forces themselves in a combat environment and to protect civilians. He writes, "[T]he protection of civilians by peacekeepers . . . entails coercive protection-the positioning of military forces between the civilian population and those that threaten them. This may involve military measures to defeat and eliminate armed groups that threaten civilians. . . . Sometimes, coercive protection may involve measures short of force such as erecting military barriers around civilian populations and the gradual removal of threats through negotiated (and sometimes coerced) disarmament." 5 Finally, when armed intervention is needed, Bellamy believes that R2P criteria are important. He notes, "We should not be lulled into thinking that there will not be cases in the future where non-consensual force is necessary. In such cases, the criteria set out by the ICISS [aka R2P] might help to guide the debate." 6 In sum, Bellamy's dataset is a list of mass atrocities that would qualify for intervention by R2P standards, obligating international action ªrst to prevent and then to stop them via armed intervention if prevention fails. If Bellamy or other proponents of R2P truly disagree, there is a simple response-identify the cases of mass atrocities since 1990 in which R2P would not demand armed intervention if nonmilitary policies failed to stop them in the ªrst place. Deciding which cases of mass atrocities do and do not merit intervention is a core purpose of my article on the pragmatic standard of humanitarian intervention. Our agreement on past cases should help focus the attention of the international community on the moral purpose of saving lives, even as we reason through how our standards would reach similar empirical positions.
-Robert A. Pape Chicago, Illinois
